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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An old Pennsylvania steel company. experiencing a serious downturn in
the market. decides to expand into the business of lead recycling, a fast growing
market in the midwest. After considerable market analysis, it determines that
there exists a dire need for a lead smelting plant. A financially risky proposition
with great potential, the company secretly invests to prevent competition, buying
land and obtaining all necessary permits. Then, poised to begin construction, it
notifies the local public of its venture, proud to be doing its part to protect the
environment while at the same time offering many new jobs to the community.
Much to its surprise, however, the local public rejects the new plant for fear of the
associated health risks. Arguments between citizens and company
representatives SOOI1 follow. Deeply invested, the company chooses to
disregard citizen concerns and moves forward with construction anyway.
Citizens react immediately. They file for a legal injunction and begin picketing
around the proposed site. They seek every avenue of resistance available. No
compromise is ever reached, and the plant is never constructed.
This scenario, although fictional, describes an ever-growing problem in
this country. Communities everywhere are rejecting facilities that they once
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readily accepted. All types of facility siting proposals, including those for prisons,
power plants, schools, hazardous waste management facilities, landfills,
hospitals, and even daycare centers, are being delayed or completely blocked by
public opposition (O'Hare 1977; Popper 1981; O'Hare, Bacow and Sanderson
1983; and Inhaber 1992). If it poses a health or environmental threat, or even a
mere aesthetic threat, it is subject to resistance. People simply no longer want
facilities sited near them that they believe will have an adverse impact on them
or their communities (Kraft and Clary 1991).
This pattern of local opposition is commonly referred to as the NIMBY (not
in my backyard) syndrome. Cases of local opposition have been steadily
increasing over the past twenty-five years. Beginning with the environmental
movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's, communities began to reject
facilities on a more regular basis (Armour 1991). People were rapidly learning
that they possessed the power to block unwanted facilities. By the late 70's,
local opposition had become so pervasive and widespread that it was "officially"
given status as a syndrome. Since that time NIMBY has gained even more
momentum (Heiman 1990), affecting more types of facilities, and experiencing
greater success. Today it occurs with such regularity that it is considered by
many observers to be one of the most significant obstacles to facility siting (Duffy
1984; Mitchell and Carson 1986; Lake 1987).
At Oklahoma State University, a team of researchers made up of faculty
and students have conducted a study aimed at exploring solutions to the NIMBY
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problem. The study, which involved the investigation of seven cases in
Oklahoma where Ilocal opposition occurred or threatened to occur, specifically
targeted hazardous waste management disputes (Focht 1995). These disputes
were selected because they are most common and, as such, solutions found for
them could likely be applied to other NIMBY disputes.
This paper documents the investigation of one of the case studies, a
hazardous waste management facility siting controversy that occurred in the
early 1980's in rural southwest Oklahoma near the small township of Haystack.
The dispute, which lasted for nearly six years, followed a c1assi,cal NIMBY
pattern. Developers, following state siting requirements, did not notify the
affected citizens until they filed their application for a construction permit. They
had already purchased the necessary land and designed the facility. Citizens
responded with opposition. Developers pressed the issue and the dispute ended
in complete gridlock.
The goal of this study was to obtain a valid interpretation and
understanding of the viewpoints held by those who participated in the Haystack
controversy in order to explain what happened and what could have been done
differently to avoid gridlock. While we were primarily interested in the concerns
of citizens, we sought the viewpoint of proponents for purposes of identifying the
stimuli to which citizens responded. We utilized four research methodologies to
accomplish this: Q methodology, a structured questionnaire, an open-ended
interview, and a card-ranking exercise; the results of which were examined in the
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context of prominent NIMBY theory. In doing this, we hoped to advance NIMBY
theory by either confirming or disproving existing thought, or by discovering
another reason for siting gridlock.
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CHAPTER n
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
There are a multitude of explanations for siting gridlock found in literature.
Among these selected for review in this chapter are four offered by Armour
(1991): inequities in the distribution of costs and benefits, perceived risks,
feelings of loss of control over forces affecting the quality of one's life and
community, and lack of trust in facility proponents and regulators. These
propositions form the conceptual foundation for this study.
Perceived Risk
Hazardous waste facilities, by their very nature, pose a number of adverse
impacts to human health and the environment. Michael Baram (1976) has
identified several, both qualitative and quantitative, that are thought to concern
the public.
• Ecology: includes erosion, landscape changes, and air and water
pollution.
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• Economy: includes private property values, taxes, local and regional
jobs.
• Regional and community quality of life: includes human health (both
physical and psychological), aesthetics, congestion, odors, traffic.
• Social and political factors: includes changes in residents and life
styles, changes in social opportunities, changes in municipal systems
(taken from Morell and Magorian 1982:62).
What is most salient to citizens is determined by the characteristics of the facility
(e.g., noisy airports, ugly power plants). Health concerns, for instance,
particularly for children's health are by far the primary public concern associated
with noxious facilities (Matheny and Williams 1985; Kraft and Clary 1991).
Portney (1991) has found this to be especially true with hazardous waste
facilities.
How people perceive these adverse impacts has been shown to play a
significant role in NIMBY disputes (Portney 1986 and 1991). There is strong
evidence in literature to suggest that laypersons do not perceive risk the same as
experts (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Siovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein 1984;
Covello 1983; Siovic 1987; Armour 1991). While both groups perceive risk as a
combination of probability and consequences, they are thought to use
substantially different criteria and analytical methods for estimating "riskiness"
(Covello 1983). Where experts tend to utilize mathematical methods of
calculating risk, laypersons tend simply to use culturally-defined heuristics to
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judge risk based on its qualitative attributes and their experience with it (Slavic
1987). It is this difference in perception that causes gridlock.
For many risk managers, risk is acceptable if the benefits offset the costs.
Through the use of scientific risk assessments they estimate risk based on the
likelihood of occurrence and the degree of the resulting hazard (Armour 1991).
They produce a quantifiable risk value (e.g. 10-6, or one in a million) that they
consider acceptable. This value is then made the point of departure from which
decisions are made. Sites are selected, and facilities designed and constructed,
often times based solely on these calculations. Little or no consideration is given
to community concerns about the imposing threat. In fact, most experts
disregard the public's perception of risk, claiming that they are not adequately
informed and are in need of education (Slavic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein 1984;
Siovic 1986; Wynne 1983; Otway 1987). Citizens not subscribing to risk
assessment results have even been labeled by some experts as irrational
(DuPont 1981).
While experts give equal weight to probability and consequence, Rubin
(1986) has found that laypersons concern themselves primarily with the
consequence. The result of scientific risk assessment is but one criterion that
laypersons consider important in evaluating risk. Psychometric studies have
revealed that they also are concerned with the qualitative attributes of risk
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Otway and von Winterfeldt 1982; Siovic, Fischoff
and Lichtenstein 1984; and Armour 1991). Siovic (1986) specifically identified
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voluntariness, dreadfulness, catastrophic potential, controllability, familiarity,
likeliness to cause injury or death, and newness as important factors.
Other issues affecting risk perception are the characteristics of the
perceiver. Social and cultural studies on risk indicate that individual values
influence perceptions (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Rayner and Cantor 1987).
Vlek and Stallen (1'980) have found that risk acceptance depends more on value
orientation and less on factual information. Experts and laypersons thus do not
share the same values when it comes to deciding on risk acceptability (Ashford
1988; Folk 1991). People highly value their health, property rights and individual
freedom and, therefore, generally reject risk assessments that conflict with, or
threaten, these values (Bord and O'Connor 1992). Also important in influencing
perceptions is how much experience a person has with risk (Fessenden-Raden
et al. 1987), how much the media has shaped their beliefs (Slovic 1987), and
what their attitudes towards risk are (Weinstein 1984).
Trust in Government and Industry
Adding to the risk perception problem is the apparent lack of trust in
government and industry (Kasperson 1986; Kunreuther et al. 1990; Pijawka and
Mushkatel 1991; Kraft and Clary 1991). Distrust, as Kraft and Clary (1991 :322)
argue, is what "fuels emotion, which heightens fear of the perceived risks."
Distrust directly affects the public's ability and willingness to evaluate siting
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proposals on their own merits (Kasperson 1986; Armour 1991). After all, it is
difficult to believe the message when you do not believe the messenger.
Trust is considered by many to be a significant dimension in siting
controversies (Kasperson et al. 1992, Siovic 1993; Kraft and Clary 1991; Kraft
1994) In fact, Hodges-Coppel (1987) argues that government and industry's low
credibility is the main cause of siting gridlock. It propels people towards
uncompromising opposition (Kraft and Clary 1991). Wildavsky and Dake
(1990:56) add "..the great struggles over perceived dangers of technology in our
time are essentially about trust and distrust of societal institutions."
Focht (1995:39) concisely explains why institutions are distrusted:
"Government is distrusted due to its past failures to protect citizens from threats
to human health, safety, welfare and the environment. Business and industry
are distrusted because of their legacy of irresponsibility, absence of care, and
liability shifting... " But this distrust is not unwarranted. These institutions, with
the help of the media, contributed to their own demise. Debacles such as
Watergate, Three-Mile Island, Love Canal and the Iran-Contra affair all serve as
benchmarks on the trail of diminishing public trust.
If the individual actions of each institution were not enough to cause
distrust, there is now evidence that they all share similar views towards siting
facilities. In particular, government, whom the public relies on to protect them, is
believed to side with industry in facility permit decisions (Fischott, Siovic and
Lichtenstein 1983; Lawler and Focht 1989; Lawler, Focht and Hatley 1992).
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Citizens also perceive this to be true: Wynne (1992) found that citizens think
siting procedures are biased towards project developers. This perception leads
citizens to question the government's ability to objectively evaluate the fallibility
of technical analyses (Armour 1991).
Feelings of Loss of Control
The inability of a community to stop the siting of an unwanted facility, thus
suffering its adverse impacts, is thought to affect people's sense of well-being.
Threatening events can shatter people's basic assumptions about the world,
giving way to new perceptions marked by threat, danger, insecurity, and self-
questioning (Edelstein 1988). Edelstein (1988: 181) adds that people may
experience "feelings of depression and a sense of being helpless and disabled."
These feelings and perceptions lead people to get involved in order to maintain a
sense of control over the forces affecting their lives (Bachrach and Zautra 1985).
There is empirical evidence to support the loss of control theory.
Edelstein (1988) found in his case study of Legler, a contaminated neighborhood
in Jackson, New Jersey, that loss of control was a dominant theme for residents.
Inequities in the Distribution of Costs and Benefits
Public opposition to needed facilities posing adverse impacts can also be
explained to some extent by the distribution of costs and benefits (Morell and
Magorian 1982; Portney 1991; Armour 1991). Oppositi.on is as O'Hare
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(1971:419) calls "...a problem of resource allocation between small but
concentrated and large but diffuse interests." Where people perceive the costs
or risks, such as effects on human health, lifestyle, environmental quality, or
property values to be higher than the benefits, which is usually the case, they
reject the facility (O'Hare 1977; O'Hare Bacow and Sanderson 1983; Kraft and
Clary 1991). The more they learn about the hazards of a facility, the more they
realize they can only lose by its siting. Unless, of course, the facility offers some
major benefit (Edelstein 1988).
Portney (1991) claims that inequities in the allocation of costs and benefits
is the basis for NIMBY because siting locally unwanted facilities elsewhere would
allow the benefits to society while eliminating the risks locally. Morell and
Magorian (1982:73) add "concern[s] over equity is a fundamental aspect of all
debates over siting."
More than just the characteristics of a facility raise questions of inequity,
however. The proposed location of a facility, whether it is in a densely populated
area or a rural area, causes concern. People in rural communities do not want to
bear the risks for industrial development, such as managing someone else's
hazardous waste (Morell and Magarian 1982; Portney 1991). Conversely,
people in industrialized areas feel that they are already bearing a
disproportionate share of society's burdens and that others should now do their
part (Portney 1991). 'The fact that one is asked to bear the risks for others
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without sharing the benefits provides a sufficient basis for perceptions of
inequity" (Edelstein 1988: 185).
Summary
The four theories described above are believed to be primary causes of
siting gridlock. Extending these theories to the Haystack case, it is hypothesized
that gridlock was due to:
1. Differences in sense of control;
2. Differences in perceived fairness of the distribution of costs and
benefits;
3. Differences in risk perception; and
4. Differences in social trust in government and industry.
12
CHAPTER lit
CASE HISTORY
On January 10, 1984, Material Management and Recovery Systems.
Incorporated (MMRS) of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma filed application with the
Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) for a permit to construct a
controlled industrial waste disposal facility in the southwest part of the state.
Following a two year feasibility study, MMRS had selected a 200 acre plot near
Haystack Mountain in portions of Section 1 and 2, Township 7 North, Range 24
West, in Greer County, Oklahoma. The site was selected based on its relatively
dry climate, low agricultural value, remote location, sparse population and
favorable geology. The facility itself was to occupy 71 acres and was to include
a landfill, a drum pit, two surface impoundments, two land treatment units, an oil
recovery system and other ancillary equipment.
On January 12 and 19, 1984, MMRS publicized its intent to construct the
commercial hazardous waste facility in the Mangum Star-News, a weekly
newspaper published in the city of Mangum, Oklahoma, located 16 miles south
of the site. MMRS also notified by letter all owners of real property within one
mile of the facility. This notification of "affected property owners" was mandated
by law. The notice provided a 45-day period during which any person residing or
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conducting business in Oklahoma could comment and/or request an informal
public meeting to present written or oral views recommending or opposing the
application. In addition, any affected property owner, or organization with
twenty-five members who were legal residents of Oklahoma could request a
formal hearing.
Shortly after notification, MMRS set out to "educate" the public about its
proposal. They conducted public meetings on January 25 and February 1, 1984,
in Mangum and Sayre, Oklahoma (19 miles north of the site). Citizen reaction to
the proposal was extremely negative. At the end of each meeting, citizens rallied
to collect money for organized resistance. By the end of the second meeting,
over $6,500 had been collected and the Haystack Environmental Group,
Incorporated (HEGI) formed. HEGI was made up of a Board of Directors who
represented all concerned citizens. It met formally one week after the first
MMRS meeting and filed a request with OSDH for a hearing. Soon after, the Elk
City (26 miles north of the site) city council adopted a resolution against the site.
The Elk City Jaycees and Chamber of Commerce led the opposition in the Elk
City area, which became a primary player in the struggle to stop construction of
the facility. Over the ensuing summer informal meetings were conducted
sporadically by all organized groups and over 10,000 letters and postcards
opposing the facility were mailed to then Governor George Nigh's office. By late
fall, the Oklahoma Farm Bureau had even passed a resolution of opposition.
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Public concern was primarily for their health. Citizens expressed their fear
at meetings of widespread contamination of the environment, especially
groundwater. Contrary to claims made by MMRS that the area was well suited
for such a facility, cit'zens presented photographs and I-witness testimony that
the area was subject to flooding and that massive underground caverns
throughout the region made it an unstable site.
On May 4, 1984, OSDH returned the permit application to MMRS issuing
a Notice of Deficiency. Of particular concern to OSDH were issues involving
groundwater and surface water contamination threats, and waste-to-liner
compatibility. MMRS was given six months to revise the application and
resubmit. Fearing that that was the final review by OSDH, HEGI and other
opposition groups from Elk City, Altus and Mangum convened a formal public
meeting in Elk City on October 16, 1984, a month before MMRS was expected to
submit it's revision. In attendance at this meeting was State Senator Gilmer
Capps and State Representative-elect Danny George. Capps went on record
saying that he was willing to author or co-author a bill outlawing hazardous waste
disposal facilities. George also commented that he was for "outlawing any and
all such dumps" (Sayre Journal, 1984).
On October 26, 1984, MMRS submitted a revised application to OSDH,
addressing most of the problems. The application was again reviewed critically
in light of revised rules and regulations and was returned to MMRS on December
26, 1984. However, a month before the State returned the application, the Altus
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Jaycees and Chamber of Commerce held a meeting with State Senator Capps,
Representative George, and Representative Howard Cotner to discuss the use
of legislation as a means to block proposed construction. This marked the
beginning of state legislative intervention.
On March 20, 1985, MMRS submitted its second revision of the
application. OSDH reviewed the documentation and asked for clarification on
certain items. MMRS submitted an addendum addressing those i,tems on May
30, 1985. That same day House Bill 1560 was enacted during an emergency
session. The bill mandated that county commissioners in counties contiguous to
a proposed hazardous waste facility assess the adequacy of the roads
designated for use by vehicles transporting wastes. Commissioners' from
Beckham and Greer counties assessed improvements at $20 million. Upon
review of the commissioners' findings by OSDH, a determination was made to
upgrade only one gravel road. This decision by OSDH appeared to favor MMRS
and caused disgruntlement among opposition leaders toward OSDH.
In an effort to force a consensus between all parties of the Haystack
dispute, Governor Nigh convened an environmental conference on June 8 and 9,
1985. In attendance were MMRS representatives, OSDH officials, HEGI
leaders, and other individuals that opposed the site. High tensions, however,
quickly transformed the conference into a forum for accusations, rather than
consensus. No progress was made.
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In spite of the problems made evident by the environmental conference,
OSOH announced its intentions to issue a construction permit on September 29,
1985, the first of two permits required before the facility could accept waste. The
decision to issue the permit was based on MMRS's compliance with the
regul,atory requirements set forth in the Rules and Regulations for Industrial
Waste Management, effective February 6, 1984 (OOH Bulletin No. 0525). There
appeared to be no other criteria used in the decision process. During the
mandatory comment period that followed the announcement, citizens requested
a public meeting. OSOH scheduled an informal meeting on December 9 and 10,
1985 and a formal hearing on December 12, 1985, and January 20, 1986. The
informal meetings were held in Mangum at the high school auditorium.
Sometime in early 1986, a procedural discrepancy in the permit
application process was identified by opponents of the facility. Due to an
incomplete mailing list, MMRS had failed to notify all affected property owners of
the scheduled hearings. The result was a delay in permit issuance until all
affected property owners could be contacted. This discrepancy proved to be a
major milestone in the defeat of the proposal. During the time that MMRS was
searching for overlooked property owners, Senate Joint Resoilution NO.33 was
approved (April 11, 1986), declaring a 12 month moratorium on processing or
issuing of construction or operating permits for all industrial waste facilities.
Immediately, OSDH issued a stay of the permit proceedings pending expiration
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of the moratorium. The moratorium was the direct result of lobbying by State
Senator Capps and Representatives' George and Cotner.
Although the stay was issued for 12 months, it was not lifted until the
summer of 1989 when MMRS requested that OSDH renew processing of its
permit. After conducting two more hearings, OSDH ruled that the entire
application be revised and resubmitted to reflect the many regulatory and
statutory changes that had occurred during the intervening three years. MMRS
disagreed with the findings of the state and filed suit in District Court in
November, 1989. MMRS contended that their permit application was subject to
the rules and regulations applicable at the time of initial filing. The case went to
court twelve months later. Without hearing testimony, the court found in favor of
the state. As of May, 1994, the application remains open pending revision by
MMRS.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
A multi-instrument survey combining both Qualitative and quantitative
methods was used in this study. The survey included Q-methodology, which
was the focal point of the study, a structured questionnaire, an open-ended
personal interview, and a card-ranking exercise. The goal of the design was to
test the six hypotheses reviewed in Chapter 2. The use of several
methodologies was intended to add validity to the study.
In the ensuing sections each part of the survey process is presented in
detail. The design of the initial survey, its pretest, and construction of the final
survey is first discussed, followed by a description of the sampling design. The
chapter concludes with a description of the specific instruments and how they
were employed in this study.
Survey Design and Pretest
As discussed in Chapter 1, this case study is part of a larger mUlti-city
study. As such, an initial survey was developed that would be flexible enough to
apply to each case, yet ensure consistency in data collection. Pretesting of the
survey was conducted in Ponca City, Oklahoma, where two versions were
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administered to a group of sixteen citizen activists recently involved in a TIMBY
(threat-in-my-back-yard) dispute. The result was a need for refinement of the
questions and a change in survey presentation from a group setting to a one-on-
one interview.
The next step was to tailor the survey to the case. This required a
thoro'ugh understanding of the events as they occurred. Historical information
was collected from several sources including Oklahoma State Department of
Health (OSDH) fact sheets; newspaper articles and legal notices from the
Mangum Star-News and the Sayre Journal (Carlisle 1984); and scholarly papers
previously written on the Haystack controversy. A general understanding of the
dispute allowed not only for adaptation of questions, but facllitation of dialogue
between the researcher and respondent. It should be noted here that not all
questions in the final survey were applicable to this study. For instance,
questions concerning sense of community, while important to the larger study,
were asked, but the results not incorporated in this paper.
Sampling Design
The survey was administered to selected stakeholders who played an
active role in the controversy. Stakeholders included local citizens, MMRS
representatives, and state and local government officials. The sample was
obtained through archival research and word of mouth. After first acquiring an
initial list of stakeholders, each was contacted by telephone, informed of the
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study and its purpose, asked to participate, and then asked to provide a name of
another stakeholder. Using this process a total of 22 potential respondents were
identified, 14 of which were willing to participate in the survey (12 citizens, 1
MMRS representative, and 1 State government official). While the desired
sample size was 23, as determined by a formula suggested for use in Q-
methodology (n [number of participants]=N [number of Q-statementsJI2-1) (Carr,
1989), 14 was sufficient to produce an acceptable multi-factor solution.
Justification for this number is provided in the Q-technique section.
Survey Description
Q Technique
Before describing the Q technique, it is beneficial to first briefly discuss
the methodology behind it and why it was selected for this study. Q
methodology is a scientific paradigm designed specifically for the direct
measurement of an individual's point of view (Brown 1980). It requires a list of
statements of opinion about the subject to be studied. Following a specific
condition of instruction, respondents rank-order the statements into a quasi-
normal forced distribution. The sorts are then subjected to principle components
factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation which reveals perspectives held
in common by participants.
Q-methodology is ideal for studies where the sample population is small,
as in this case, because it concerns populations of statements rather than
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populations of people. A further advantage of Q is that it is an abductive
technique, that is, it reveals a participant's subjectivity with minimum researcher-
induced bias. Individuals are factored across variables (statements) instead of
variables across individuals. In this manner, an individual's self-referent
perspective is made operant. For those seeking a complete description of Q-
methodology, refer to Brown's (1980) book, Political Subjectivity: Applications of
Q-Methodology in Political Science.
The Q-sample in this study consisted of 47 statements derived by the
research team about environmental decision making (see Table 3). The
statements included in the Q sample address each of the 6 hypotheses. For
example, equity was addressed by statement #38. Trust was addressed by
statement #32. Respondents were to read through the statements in order to
get a feel for their content and separate them into three equal groups of most
agree, neutral and least agree, while thinking about their views concerning the
siting of a hazardous waste facility in their community. They were then to spread
the cards out, reread the statements, and place each on the form board starting
with most agree (+5), then least agree (-5), and back and forth until all cards
were placed on the board. Respondents were invited to review their sort and
make any necessary changes. Each was afforded the opportunity to expound
on their reasoning for their specific sort. The final Q-sorts were preserved by
transferring them to a score sheet. Analysis of the sorts was conducted back at
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Oklahoma State University using PC QUANAL, a statistical factor analysis
program designed specifically for Q-methodology (Van Tubergen 1975).
The final step in the Q technique process is to validate or confirm the
interpretation of the results and assign a title to each factor based on the
perspective revealed by the Q sorts. Validation is accomplished by contacting
the "pure loader" for each factor. The pure loader is that person who's sort most
closely describes the factor. He or she is asked if the assigned title is
appropriate and descriptive.
Structured Questionnaire
The structured questionnaire was designed to ascertain the extent of the
respondents' involvement in the controversy, their relationship with MMRS and
government agencies, and their social and environmental context (see Appendix
A). This information was used to interpret the Q factors and the discussion of
results from all four methodologies. The social and environmental context data
was collected for purposes of linking demographic, social, and physical variab!les
with responses collected from the other methodologies in the survey. Specific
questions were aimed at respondents' careers, ages, their proximity to the
proposed facility, and their community involvement.
The questionnaire consisted of 8 questions, mostly multiple choice, with a
few fill-in-the-blank. It was given to the respondents and read aloud by the
interviewer. This was done primarily to ensure clarity of the questions. The
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respondents marked the appropriate answers and returned the questionnaire to
the interviewer. The questionnaire was reviewed for completeness and
readability.
Open-Ended Interview
This method brings greater depth and interpretation to the Q-sort and
rank-order card sort by providing respondents an opportunity to express freely
their viewpoints. Participants were encouraged to elaborate on their responses,
differentiate between issues, and clarify any potential interviewer
presented today (see Appendix B).
Respondents were specifically instructed to answer questions based on
respondents' opinions and recollections of the dispute, why and for what reasons
The interview contained twelve questions regarding
they became active, their concerns about the siting proposal, their perception of
misinterpretations.
government, industry and the community, effects of the proposal on themselves
related to their sense of community and on the community itself, and finally, what
they would like to see happen to avoid controversy if the same situation were
their viewpoint at the time of the dispute. Extreme care was taken not to
influence or lead respondents in any way that would bias their responses. With
permission, all open dialogue was recorded. At the completion of the interview,
respondents were given opportunity to add or expound upon their responses.
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Rank-Ordered Card Sorts
consisted of thirteen cards (see Appendix C) inscribed with decision criteria
believe should be important in siting hazardous waste facilities, while the public
Each sort was administered
Two rank-ordered card sorts were employed in this case. One sort
typically used by policy makers when proposing construction of hazardous waste
separately. The decision criteria sort was aimed at determining what citizens
participation strategies (see Appendix D).
management facilities, and the other, nine cards with preferred public
participation sort was aimed at determining what citizens believe is the best way
to avoid gridlock.
In both sorts, respondents were to rank the cards in order of subjective
importance. They were informed that the cards were in no particular order and
that there was no "rrght" way to arrange them. They were to read through the
cards first, asking for explanation if necessary, sort them, and then lay them out
in rank order. No ties were allowed. They were encouraged to examine their
sorts and make changes if desired. After they had felt comfortable with their
sorts, they were asked to group them, if possible, by those highly important,
somewhat important, and not important. At a minimum, they were asked to sort
them into at least two categories. Frequency distributions were then tabulated
for both sorts.
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Procedures for Administering the Survey
The research participants were initially contacted by telephone two weeks
in advance and asked to voluntarily participate in the survey. Appointments were
scheduled and interviews conducted over a period of four days. As many as four
interviews were conducted in a given day. All interviews were conducted during
the daytime.
The day of the interview, respondents were again contacted by telephone
for final coordination. Interviews, as stated earlier, were conducted at the
respondents' home or place of employment. The interview process began with
brief introductories, presentation of researcher credentials, and a more thorough
explanation of the study. Respondents were then asked to sign a consent form
signifying their voluntary participation. All respondents were assured complete
anonymity.
Interviews were conducted in a one-an-one setting. No one else was
allowed to sit in during the interview, or in any other way influence the
respondent. The survey was presented in the following order: structured
questionnaire, open-ended interview, Q-sort, and rank-ordered card sort. It was
administered while sitting at a table so card sorts could be easily accomplished.
Prior to administering each instrument, participants were thoroughly informed of
its purpose and given appropriate instruction. At anytime during the interview,
they were free to stop or take a break. At the conclusion of the interview,
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respondents were again explained the purpose of the study and asked if they
would like a copy of the completed research paper.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Stakeholder Demographics
Fourteen stakeholders participated in this study. Eleven were active
members or supporters of HEGI, which opposed the facility, and three supported
the facility. Facillty supporters included the MMRS representative, the state
government official, and a citizen/business owner who owned land near the
proposed site. Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of each.
Of those that participated in this study, only three (H4, H5. and H6) lived
within 10 miles of the proposed site. Respondents HB, H9, and H10 owned
property within 10 miles of the site, but lived more than 30 miles away. The
MMRS representative and government official were not from the area.
Also, eight of the respondents admitted that they were still active with,in
their communities in citizens' groups or service organizations other than HEGI.
Furthermore, all but one (H3) willingly participated on a frequent or continuous
basis. The remaining demographic criteria are self explanatory.
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
Respondents Proximity to Currently Frequency Gender Age Education Occupation
Site (miles) Active
OPPONENTS
H1 10-20 No Never F 58 High School Farmer
H2 10-20 No Never M 60 4 yr College Farmer
H3 20-50 Yes Occasionally M 48 Law School Lawyer/Rancher
H4 <10 No Never M 57 High School Farmer
H5 <10 No Never F 57 1 yr College Farmer
N H6 <10 Yes Continuously M 74 4 yr College Farmer
CD
H7 10-20 No Never M 55 High School Gin Operator
H9 <10 Yes Frequently M 63 1 yr College Insurance/Farmer
H10 <10 Yes Continuously F 68 High School Business
Owner/Rancher
H11 20-50 Yes Frequently M 50 Graduate Business Owner
School
H12 20·50 Yes Continuously M 42 Pharmacy Pharmacist
School
PROPONENTS
H8 <10 No Never M 64 4 yr College Business Owner
H13 20-50 Yes Continuously M 40 Graduate Politician
School
H14 100-150 Yes Continuously M 54 High School Engineer
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Results of the Personal Interviews
Opponents
Citizens' who opposed the facility did so because they perceived the risks
to be unacceptably high. They were more concerned with the consequences of
the facility than the probability of those consequences occurring. They
specifically identified threats to health, property values, posterity, and the
environment. Of these, health threats, particularly those to future generations,
was of primary concern.
Citizens rejected the probability estimates calculated by MMRS to address
these concerns because, as one respondent put it, they were "inconsistent and
incomplete." Citizens did not think that MMRS had weighed all the factors.
"MMRS didn't know about the land they were after. They're just a
bunch of educated fools. "
"The area has flooded, even though they say it hasn't, and there
are a bunch of sinkholes and caverns below the site that could
collapse. "
"The people in the Haystack group were people who lived on the
land surrounding the proposed site, who know the land, the water
shed and how the proposed site would affect it really. JI
This theme routinely appeared throughout the interview process. Citizens
were disappointed in MMRS and state government officials. They could not
understand how MMRS was able to acquire a construction permit for the facility
given the apparent discrepanoies in the risk estimates. This led them to question
the integrity of both the state and MMRS.
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While some citizens believed that the Health Department was genuinely
concerned about them,
"They (Health Department) were stuck in the middle trying to help
us but having to meet the requirements of the EPA. JJ
"They (Health Department) are too busy to keep up with all the
laws. I think they meant well, but their hands were tied."
others believed that it had sided wilth MMRS, and that it was ignoring its
responsibilities to the public. Some even believed that it was infliuenced by
money.
"The health department believed the company rather than us. "
"I think that the health department was bought off. II
As for MMRS, citizens believed that they were lying to them, withholding
information and/or inaccurately representing the facts. They were convinced that
MMRS's sale purpose for building the facility was monetary gain.
"The company was dishonest. They lied from the beginning and
just kept on lying. II
"In my opinion, these people (MMRS) were not concerned about
our welfare, only money. "
However, when asked whether they distrusted government and industry
as a whole, citizens were not so condemning. All 11 of them expressed a certain
degree of trust in both institutions, even though they questioned their ability to
make sound environmental decisions.
"Well, I trust them (govemment), but not to make decisions about
the environment."
"I don't distrust industry, I just think they're only interested in the
bottom line."
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Of particular concern was the role of federal government in the decision making
process. They believe that the federal government is out of touch with local
communities and should have therefore exduded themselves from the siting
process.
"I trust government, I just don't feel represented by the federal
government because I live in small town."
"The federal government doesn't feel for the community. They're
too far disconnected. "
Industry, on the other hand, was not so scrutinized. Citizens agreed that there is
a need for industry to provide goods and services to society, but that they must
be honest and environmentally responsible.
"I think industry is needed if it is for the good of the country. They
have progressed in the environmental area."
"I'm for industry if they have a proven record of being
environmentally safe."
Citizens also expressed concerns of inequity in the distribution of the
facility's costs and benefits. They did not believe they should have to bear the
risks from the facility while those living 'in the city reaped all the benefits. Many
thought companies should be required to reduce or eliminate the production of
hazardous waste and store that which they do produce at the plant where it was
generated, rather than ship it to some remote location.
"How come we have to suffer from the facility when all the
advantages stay in the city?"
"If they're going to put the waste here, then bring all the jobs with
it. "
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"Companies should be forced to keep the waste at their plant and
not dump it on communities. "
Other questions of inequity that surfaced involved site selection. Several
citizens opined that the Haystack site was selected not because of its
supposedly ideal geological characteristics, but because of the economically
depressed condition of the area and the unlikelihood of citizen opposition given
the site's remoteness.
"They didn't think we'd fight because we're just farmers and
ranchers. They acted like this area was a wasteland and that no
one would care. "
Proponents
Due to the different roles each proponent played in the dispute, the results
of each interview was different. Therefore, for ease of discussion, the results are
presented separately.
MMRS Representative
The MMRS representative blamed both the citizens and the Health
Department for the demise of the facility proposal. He accused citizens of being
uninformed about the facility and unwilling to accept the information that was
provided. He thought they were selfish and only opposed the facility because it
was easier to oppose it than it was to accept it.
"Citizens want use of the environment, just not the responsibility of
keeping it up."
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He blamed the Health Department for not providing the necessary technical
support and unjustly siding with citizens. In fact, he believes the Health
Department worked with citizens to repeal the facility.
"We did everything they (OSDH) asked of us, and then they
changed the rules. "
"They (citizens) did not even know where the actual location of the
site was going to be. We tried to explain it and they wouldn't
listen. "
"Those people (citizens) were convinced that radioactive waste
would be stored there at the facility."
In his opinion, MMRS had met the Health Department's hazardous waste facility
siting requirements, which are designed to protect human health and the
environment, and therefore should have been allowed to proceed.
He strongly believed MMRS is a responsible company that is
environmentally conscious. He pointed to a specific instance of how MMRS
refrained from illegally buying legislative influence as an example.
"There were lobbyist who told us to give them a blank checkbook
and it would be done."
However, he thinks there must be a bal·ance between the economy and the
environment.
"You can't deny a man use of his property because of
environmental concerns. "
State Government Official
The government official saw himself as a dedicated public servant trying
to protect the interests of all citizens. His involvement in the dispute was
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therefore, in his eyes, mandatory. He believed that government's role is to be an
arbitrator, settling disputes between citizens and industry, even though he
admitted that government is not always sensitive to the public's needs.
"Government is unable to keep pace with citizen concerns. They
do not always effectively act in citizens' best interest. "
He did, however, support the Health Department's actions in the dispute.
He thought they listened to the citizens and tried to incorporate their concerns
into the decision process. His only criticism of the Health Department was that
they did not possess adequate technical expertise.
"They (Health Department) should have been in tune with current
technology. They should have searched for better methods, rather
than simply following the letter of the law. "
MMRS's actions also received overall support from the official. He thinks
that they were conscientious about what they were doing, following the law, and
that they were employing the best available technology of the time. He criticized
them only for not listening to citizens and being inflexible.
"MMRS should have held more meetings and established better
relations with citizens. They should have amended their plan. JI
He believed industry is necessary and, if they are good "corporate ci,tizens", they
should be trusted to construct and operate hazardous waste facilities.
Citizen/Business Owner
This respondent owned property that MMRS wanted to buy for the
construction of the hazardous waste facility. While he did not sell any of his
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property, he did believe that MMRS had complied with the requirements of the
Health Department and should have been allowed to construct.
"I didn't have a problem with the site if they (MMRS) complied with
the law."
He only stayed involved in the siting process because he questioned MMRS's
financial ability to clean-up in the event of an accidental release.
He generally trusts in government and believes that they are responsible
s~'--.--/for regulating indUi . . e does not believe, however, that industry should be
trusted to make siting decisions on their own.
"If they (Industry) were left to decide on their own, they would
probably act in self-interest."
Q Factor Results and Interpretation
Five orthogonal factors were extracted using the principle components
method. Retained were those factors with an eigen value greater than 1 and
having an explained variance greater than 7%. Two factors met these criteria.
Each was distinct as indicated by their low correlation coefficient (0.185).
Together, they explain 51 % of the total variance and account for all 14
respondents.
Table 2 contains the re-ordered matrix for the factors after varimax
rotation. Significant (p s.001) factor loadings were those with scores of 0.451
(3.090 standard error=3.090 [1/.J47 ]=0.451) or greater. At this critical value, 11
of the factor loadings are significant, 1 loading j,s confounded (for H1 0), meaning
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-the individual loaded significantly on both factors, and two are considered not
significant (H8 and H13). However, at ps.01 the loadings of both H8 and H13
are significant on Factor B. Therefore, in the discussion Q sorts from H8 and
H13 are included.
Table 3 presents the z-scores for each of the statements comprising each
of the factors. The z-scores can be used to reveal the structure of the common
factor. The z-score arrays allow interpretation of the perspect.ives held by those
respondents who loaded significantly on that factor. Of particular interest are
those statements with a z-score of ± 1.00 or more. These are statements about
which respondents had strong feelings. However, all distinguishable statements
(those more than 1 standard deviation apart) and consensus statements that
helped to further explain the factors are given consideration.
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TABLE 2
RE-ORDERED FACTOR MATRIX
Respondents Factor A Factor B Pure
FACTOR A
H1 Farmer 0.807 -0.020 0.999
H3 Lawyer 0.833 0.058 0.995
H6 Farmer 0.804 0.083 0.990
H9 Insurance 0.703 0.080 0.987
H7 Gin Operator 0.777 0.145 0.966
H2 Farmer 0.682 0.155 0.951
H11 Business 0.781 -0.197 0.940
H4 Farmer 0.648 0.260 0.862 ~
H10 Business 0.666 0.459 0.678 ~c.o
>
-H12 Pharmacist 0.582 0.448 0.629 Z~
;z;'.1
H5 Farmer 0.474 0.374 0.617 ~~
....
--
FACTOR B
'J)
-.r
Z
H14 Business 0.050 0.578 0.993 c:t:t
~
H8 Business -0.181 0.431 0.851 §
H13 Politician 0.308 0.450 0.682
where p:5.001, critical value equals 0.451
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TABLE 3
TYPAL ARRAY Z-SCORES
z-Scores
Statements Factor Factor
A B
1. Waste facility siting means economic growth and -1.7 0.4
prosperity for the community.
2. Offering cash payments to a community is the same as 0.3 -1.6
a bribe.
3. When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is -1.7 -1.7
good even if there is resulting pollution.
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a -1.5 -1.3
company to make a profit, the restrictions should be
relaxed.
5. Industry works with communities to maintain a good -0.7 0.2
public image.
6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major -0.3 1.8
consideration in siting decisions. ~
7. Citizens need to control which risks they have to put up 0.8 -1.0
-~with. t&1
8. We should not take any chances with the environment. 1.6 0.2 ;>
-~
9. I tolerate risk as a fact of life, but I don't like it. -0.2 0.9 ::>
:zJ
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because -2.3 -1.2
--
~
tomorrow's technology will solve the problem. ...
-:c
11. The world would be a better place to live if we could go -0.5 -1.4 ...r:
back to the good old days. :?C
12. It is better to put facilities in communities with high -1.3 -0.9 ~<f
unemployment; the people there need the jobs. ~13. The people who benefit the most from a waste facility 1.5 0.2
are not the ones who bear the risk.
14. Government and industry know what they are doing; -1.7 -0.5
they are the experts.
15. Cost effectiveness in more important to industry and 0.3 -0.3
government than environmental issues.
16. The government adequately enforces environmental -1.5 0.3
laws to protect human health and safety.
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
TYPAL ARRAY Z-SCORES
z-Scores
Statements Factor Factor
A B
17. Industry usually complies with environmental laws -1.4 0.8
even when it costs them money.
18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry 1.1 -0.7
advantage.
19. The character of a community changes after a waste 0.1 -0.3
facility is located there.
20. Allowing a waste facility to locate in a community 0.5 -0.2
divides a community.
21. Waste facilities give a community a bad reputation. 0.5 0.3
22. Citizens should be involved in every step of a siting 1.1 0.7
decision.
23. Citizens have ample opportunity to be involved in siting -0.9 1.1
decisions in their community. ~
::-4
-24. Industry, government and the public should decide 0.6 0.5 ~
together what level of pollution should be allowed. ~
;>
25. All information should be shared in easily understood 0.7 1.2 -Z
language as soon as it is available. =:>
z:J
26. Who provides information makes a difference to me; 1.0 2.1 ~~the person must be honest.
-:,/)
27. It is really hard to know if decision makers have the 0.4 0.7 -t:
same values as I do. ~,-.
-28. It is impossible to know whether or not a process is 0.1 1.5 ::tood:
really safe without adequate technical education. ~~29. If the public were more familiar with the operation of a -0.9 1.2
waste facility, they would be more willing to consider it.
30. Citizens should have their own experts. 0.8 0.4
31. We would all be better off if the legal procedures were 0.6 0.7
easier to follow.
32. Government shouldn't be trusted in making siting -0.0 -0.4
decisions.
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z-Scores
Factor Factor
A B
-0.4 -0.8
0.8 -0.4
0.4 -0.1
-0.5 -1.8
1.2 -0.5
1.2 -1.5
-0.0 1.1
-0.6 1.2
-1.3 -0.1
0.2 -0.0
0.6 -1.2
TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
TYPAL ARRAY Z-SCORES
Statements
33. Government uses citizen opinion against them.
34. Economic special interests have too much influence in
siting decisions.
35. The people living in a community know best what is
good for them.
36. Citizens should initially oppose all proposals for siting
by industry.
37. It is better to be active today than to be radioactive
tomorrow.
38. If you have enough money, you can get away with
polluting.
39. Conflict in decision making is necessary and healthy.
40. Consensus is impossible when activists become
involved in environmental decisions.
41. The chief function of government is to support the
economy.
42. Just being physically present in situations where
environmental decisions are made is not enough.
43. The siting process is unfair because the results provide
greater risks to the people who are ethnically different or
poor.
44. Environmental radicals are necessary to bring balance
to the issues.
45. There are clean technologies available that must be
used now to reduce pollution.
46. Government and industry skew their risk estimates to
suit their own purposes.
47. Industry must be required to recycle, reduce wastes,
and use safer techniques and raw materials.
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-0.2
1.1
0.6
1.5
-1.7
1.0
0.6
0.8
"
stm1
Interpreting the Factors
Each factor was examined within the context of the four NIMBY theories
discussed in Chapter 2. The statements were coded according to the theory
they best described. The factors were given titles that characterize the
perspective represented by the statements which comprise the factor structure.
Factor A: Cynical Citizens
This factor accounts for 43% of the explained variance and describes the
perspectives of ten of the 11 citizens actively opposed to the facility. Citizens
loading on this factor believe foremost that steps should be taken to reduce or
eliminate the need for hazardous waste management facilities. They believe that
the risks posed by the facility to human health and the environment are too high.
8
10
45
47
We should not take any chances with the environment.
It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because
tomorrow's technology will solve the problem.
There are clean technologies available that must be
used now to reduce pollution.
Industry must be required to recycle, reduce wastes,
and use safer techniques and raw materials.
A B
1.6 0.2
-2.3 -1.2
1.1 1.0
1.5 0.8
However, they do not trust industry to act responsibly towards public health and
the environment,
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414
17
26
38
If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a
company to make a profit, the restrictions should be
relaxed.
Government and industry know what they are doing;
they are the experts.
Industry usually complies with environmental laws even
when it costs them money.
Who provides information makes a difference to me;
the person must be honest.
If you have enough money, you can get away with
polluting.
A
-1.5
-1.7
-1.4
1.0
1.2
B
-1.3
0.8
0.8
2.1
-1.5
particularly in the absence of governmental regulation, which they believe is
prevalent.
They therefore demand to be involved in every step of the siting process.
16
18
41
22
37
The government adequately enforces environmental
laws to protect human health and safety.
Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry
advantage.
The chief function of the government is to support the
economy.
Citizens should be involved in every step of the siting
decision.
It is better to be active today rather than to be
radioactive tomorrow.
-1.5
1.1
-1.3
1.1
1.2
0.3
-0.7
-0.1
0.7
-0.5
They also question the fairness of the siting process, concerned that the
costs or risks and benefits associated with hazardous waste facilities are not
equally distributed.
1 Waste facility siting means economic growth and
prosperity for the community.
43
-1.7 0.4
5W
312
13
When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is
good even if there is resulting pollution.
It is better to put facilities in communities with high
unemployment; the people there need the jobs.
The people who benefit the most from a waste facility
are not the ones who bear the risks.
Factor B: Defenders of the Institution
A
-1.7
-1.3
1.5
B
-1.7
-0.9
0.2
This factor accounts for 8% of the explained variance and defines the
facility proponents, which includes the MMRS representative, the government
official, and a citizen/business owner that owned property in the area. These
persons believe that siting decisions should be objective and rational,
A B
6 Scientific risk assessment should be the major -0.3 1.8
consideration in siting decisions.
7 Citizens need to control which risks they have to put up 0.8 -1.0
with.
2 Offering cash payments to a community is the same as 0.3 -1.6
a bribe.
and that if citizens had a better understanding of the technical criteria used by
experts in designing facilities and selecting sites, they would be more willing to
accept them.
--,
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It is impossible to know whether or not a process is
really safe without adequate technical information.
If the public were more familiar with the operation of a
waste facility, they would be more willing to consider it.
44
0.1
-0.9
1.5
1.2
-
They share a concern for the environment,
10
45
It doesn't matter how much we pollute today because
tomorrow's technology will solve the problem.
There are clean technologies available that must be
used now to reduce pollution.
A
-2.3
1.1
B
-1.2
1.0
and believe that government and industry act responsibly;
4 If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a
company to make a profit, the restrictions should be
relaxed.
-1.5 -1.3
therefore, citizens should trust them to make decisions for the good of society.
They also believe the existing siting process is fair and equitable,
43 The siting process is unfair because the results provide 0.6 -1.2
greater risks to the people who are ethnically different
or poor.
3 When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is -1.7 -1.7
good even if there is resulting pollution.
38 If you have enough money, you can get away with 1.2 -1.5
polluting.
11 The world would be a better place to live if we could go -0.5 -1.4
back to the good old days.
allowing plenty of opportunity for citizen involvement,
23 Citizens have ample opportunity to be involved in siting -0.9 1.1
decisions in their community.
39 Conflict in decision making i's necessary and healthy. -0.0 1.1
25
26
All information should be shared in easily understood
language as soon as it is available.
Who provides information makes a difference to me;
the person must be honest.
0.7
-0.9
1.2
1.1
and that extreme opposition is unwarranted and unproductive.
45
A B
36 Citizens should initially oppose all proposals for siting -0.5 -1.8
by industry.
40 Consensus is impossible when activists become -0.6 1.2
involved in environmentall decisions.
44 Environmental radicals are necessary to bring balance -0.2 -1.7
to the issues.
Differences Between Factors
Focusing on those statements which are more than 1 standard deviation
apart further reveals just how different the perspectives are (see Appendix E for
a complete list). Cynical Citizens and Defenders of the Institution do not agree
on the methods for judging risk acceptability,
6 Scientific risk assessment should be a major -0.3 1.8
consideration in siting decisions.
7 Citizens need to control which risks they have to put up 0.8 -1.0
with.
29 If the public were more familiar with the operation of a -0.9 1.2
waste facility, they would be more willing to consider it.
or the fairness of the siting process.
1
43
Waste facility siting means economic growth and
prosperity for the community.
The siting process is unfair because the results provide
greater risks to the people who are ethnically different
or poor.
-1.7
0.6
0.4
-1.2
They also cannot come to terms on how much and to what degree citizens
should be involved in the decision making process.
23 Citizens have ample opportunity to be involved in siting
decisions.
46
-0.9 1.1
37
40
It is better to be active today than to be radioactiv,e
tomorrow.
Consensus is impossible when activists become
involved in environmental decisions.
A
1.2
-0.6
8
-0.5
1.2
O·
Their strongest point of disagreement, however, is over institutional trust; not
trust in general, but specific trust in industry and government to make sound
environmental decisions. Defenders of the Institution believe they should be
trusted to make environmental decisions, while Cynical Citizens believe
otherwise.
16
17
18
38
The government adequately enforces environmental -1.5
laws to protect human health and the environment.
Industry usually complies with environmental laws even -1.4
when it costs them money.
Environmental laws are full of loopholes for industry 1.1
advantage.
If you have enough money, you can get away with 1.2
polluting.
Similarities Between Factors
0.3
0.8
-0.7
-1.5
-.
:r.
-/'.
There are 22 consensus statements (see Appendix F for a complete list),
four of which are salient (z-score >1.0). Cynical citizens and Defenders of the
Institution agree that the environment should be protected and that economic
justification is not acceptable.
'1"
3
4
When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is
good even if there is resulting pollution.
If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a
company to make a profit, the restrictions should be
relaxed.
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-1.7
-1.5
-1.7
-1.3
45
47
There are clean technologies available that must be
used now to reduce pollution.
Industry must be required to recycle, reduce wastes,
and use safer techniques and raw materials.
Decision Criteria Card Sort Data
A
1.1
1.5
B
1.0
0.8
The frequency distributions for the decision criteria card rankings for
opponents and proponents are presented in descending order in Tables 4 and 5,
respectively. The respondents ranked the cards in order of their relative
perceived importance.
While it is easy to identify which decision criteria are important and which
are unimportant by simply looking at the Tables, more can be learned by
studying the groupings of criteria. For example, in Table 4 a discernible break
lies between community disruption and technicaillegal education. Not
surprisingly, the nine criteria in the top group all reflect personal (subjective) and
community concerns. The bottom group, which is of little or no importance to
opponents, pertains to technical concerns.
In Table 5, a distinction can also be made between technical/legal
education and alternative technologies. Again, notice that objective criteria in
the top group ranked as most important, whereas citizen concerns rank in the
bottom group.
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Clearly, opponents and proponents do not agree on what is important in
siting decisions. But, just how far apart they are and on what issues become
dramatically apparent when comparing the results of the two tables. Specifically,
citizens regard personal risk judgments, citizen involvement, and alternative
technologies as very important, while proponents believe quite the opposi,te.
They instead prefer that decisions be based on economic impacts. Not
surprisingly, citizens ranked company economics dead last.
TABLE 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION CRITERIA CARD RAN KINGS
(OPPONENTS)
Frequency Distribution (Importance) ~i
Criterion Highly Somewhat Not
-
Understanding Local Culture 8 1 2 ~~
Personal Risk Judgments 7 3 1 :>
-.
."
....~
Access to Information 7 2 2 ::J
~J
Citizen Involvement 6 4 1 -.
.1";
Alternative Technologies 6 4 1 -.I~'
Fairness 5 6 0
...,
F
Institutional Trust 5 4 2 .-L
Community Economics 5 4 2 ~
~
Community Disruption 5 3 3 :>
Technical/Legal Education 3 5 3
Views Towards Technology 1 7 3
Scientific Risk Estimates 1 5 5
Company Economics 0 4 7
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TABLE 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DECrSION CRITERIA CARD RANKINGS
(PROPONENTS)
Frequency Distribution (Importance)
Criterion Highly Somewhat Not
Company Economics 3 0 0
Community Economics 3 0 0
Fairness 3 0 0
Institutional Trust 2 1 0
Access to Information 2 1 0
Understanding Local Culture 2 1 0
Scientific Risk Estimates 2 0 1
Technical/Legal Education 1 2 0
Alternative Technologies 1 1 1
Community Disruption 1 1 1
Citizen Involvement 1 1 1
Personal Risk Judgments 0 2 1
Views Towards Technology 0 1 2
Participation Strategy Card Sort Data
Tables 6 and 7 present the rank order of participation strategies
descending order for both opponents and proponents, respectively.
Opponents strongly favor partidpation strategies that empower them.
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fact, they almost exclusively prefer public referendum, followed closely by an
oversight board and citizen control. Their next choices are binding arbitration
and third party mediation, which involve sharing power. The remaining
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strategies are ranked according to the amount of power they afforded citizens.
Thus, preemption was ranked last. It is interesting to note that the current
approach, public comment, is not highly regarded.
TABLE 6
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION STRATEGY CARD
RANKINGS (OPPONENTS)
Frequency Distribution (Importance)
1
Criterion
Referendum
Oversight Board
Citizen Control
Binding Arbitration
Third Party Mediation
Public Comment
Consultation
Non-Binding Negotiation
Preemption
Highly Somewhat Not
10 1 0
8 2 1
6 3 2
4 6 1
4 6 1
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3 5 3
2 4 5
a 3 8
.,
Proponents, however, are split on their choice of participation strategies.
While all favor a strategy of limited citizen involvement, the government official
and the MMRS representative prefer the current public comment approach. The
citizen/business owner rejected this strategy in support of an oversight board. All
three proponents did agree that preemption and citizen control are not preferred.
Their rankings suggest that they did not want sole power, nor did they want to
give up power.
51
#
L
":t
TABLE 7
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION STRATEGY CARD
RANKINGS (PROPONENTS)
Criterion
Public Comment
Consultation
Third Party Mediation
Oversight Board
Non-Binding Negotiation
Referendum
Binding Arbitration
Preemption
Citizen Control
Frequency Distribution (Importance)
Highly Somewhat Not
2 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 2
1 0 2
012
o 1 2
003
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Three major findings resulted from this study. First, overall support was
found for Armour's (1991) propositions that differences between facility
proponents and opponents in risk perception, sense of control, fairness, and
institutional trust contribute to siting policy gridlock. Second, opponents did not
harbor feelings of broad institutional distrust prior to the dispute as had been
found in other studies on public opposition (Kasperson et. al. 1992; Pijawka and
Mushkatel 1991). Third, civic parochialism, while not specifically identified as a
hypothesis in Chapter 2, but believed to be a key aspect of NIMBY (DuPont
1981: Kraft and Clary 1991), was not prevalent among opponents. This chapter
carefully reviews each of these findings.
Test of Armour's Propositions
Proposition 1: Differences in risk perception lead to gridlock
There is strong evidence to support this proposition, particularly in the
decision criteria card ranking data. As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, opponents
and proponents disagreed on the role of personal risk judgments and scientific
53
...
--
r
.
L
"1
risk estimates in siting decisions. Opponents believed that personal risk
judgments should be most important, whereas proponents preferred the use of
scientific risk estimates. This difference was complicated by the fact both sides
all but rejected the other's preference.
A disparity in risk preference is also found in the Q sort results. For
example, proponents most agreed with the statement "scientific risk assessment
should be a major consideration in siting decisions" (Statement #6), while
opponents most agreed with the statement "we should not take any chances with
the environment" (Statement #8). These results suggest that proponents were
more willing to accept risk whereas opponents were uncomfortable with risk,
particularly with scientific estimates of it.
Clearly, opponents and proponents did not attach the same importance to
different constructions of risk, at least not in respect to siting hazardous waste
facilities. Opponents were more risk averse, where proponents were more risk
tolerant. It is this fundamental difference in opinion that contr'ibuted to the siting
gridlock.
Proposition 2: Differences in social trust of institutioos lead to gridlock
The results reveal mixed support for this proposition. The interviews and
the Q sort data show that opponents di:strusted MMRS (Statements #4, #17, #18
and #38) and OSDH (Statements #14, #16, and #18) insofar as environmental
enforcement and competence were concerned. This seems to indicate the
54
....
-..
.
J
existence of a wariness on the part of opponents concerning deference to OSDH
and MMRS to protect their environmental and health interests. Interestingly,
however, government was not distrusted to make siting decisions (Statement
#32). The interviews confirmed this sense of cautious trust of government and
industry with respect to protection of human health and the environment. This
suggests while trust may have contributed to siting decision gridlock, it was not
the initial cause of the MMRS siting opposition. A more in-depth discussion of
this finding is presented later in this chapter.
Proposition 3: Differences in perceived fairness of the distribution of costs and
benefits lead to gridlock
Opponents and proponents disagreed on the fairness of the siting
proposal, even though the Q sort (Statements #3 and #12) and decision criteria
card sort results (Tables 4 and 5) show they agreed that fairness should be
important in siting decisions.
Proponents maintained that the existing siting process was equitable and
would have fairly distributed risks, costs, and benefits within the community
(Statement #43). Everyone, in their opinion, stood to benefit from the facility,
including themselves, the citizens in and around Haystack, and society in
general.
Opponents, on the other hand, thought the siting process was unfair
(Statement #43) and that only MMRS would truly benefit (Statements #1 and
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#13). They believed they were "singled out" to host the facility for reasons other
than what MMRS claimed. The following citizen quote accurately summarizes
their concerns:
"The company (MMRS) claimed that they picked Haystack because of the
soil conditions, and stuff like that. I think they picked us because they
didn't think we'd get organized and fight. We argued with them and
showed them evidence that the area had sink holes and was no good, but
they just wouldn't listen. They only cared about the money they could
make and not us. "
PrQpQsitiQn 4: Differences in sense of cQntrollead tQ gridlock
The results provide for support this propositiQn. Frustrated with the
inability tQ change what seemed tQ be an inevitable siting, QppQnents
experienced feelings Qf loss Qf contrQL These feelings were clearly articulated in
the interviews, as illustrated by the fQIIQwing qUQte:
"We didn't have any cQntrol over what was happening. We met
with them (proponents) several times but the never paid heed to
what we were saying. "
This led QppQnents tQ judgments that MMRS and OSDH eQuid nQt be fully
trusted tQ make facility siting decisiQns. FQr this reaSQn, they appealed outside
of the normal siting process to the state legislature, which set the stage for siting
gridlock.
Diffuse vs Specific Trust
The mixed results with respect to institutional trust can be explained by
reference to David EastQn's (1965) distinctiQn amQng types Qf SUPPQrt. EastQn
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posits that in a political system authorities must have the support of society if
they are to avoid difficulties in implementing their decisions. He identifies two
types of support, specific and diffuse. Specific support is that which "flows from
the favorable attitudes and predisposition stimulated by outputs that are
perceived by [citizens] to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation",
and general, or diffuse support, is "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will
that helps [citizens] to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or
the effect of which they see as damaging to their interests" (1965:273). By
applying his observations, and substituting the word "trust" for "support," an
interesting insight into the trust results in this case study can be gained.
The similarities in diffuse trust between opponents and proponents after
the siting controversy suggest that the differences in trust probably evolved
during the conflict as different judgments of specific trust of the siting process
itself. Specific distrust among opponents was generated by the failure of
decision makers to address their expectations, or concerns, regarding sense of
control, perceptions of risk, and fairness, coupled with an attempted exclusion of
opponents from the decision making process. This may explain why opponents
expressed distrust in OSDH in making the MMRS siting decision, but still trusted
government siting decision making in general.
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NIMBY vs NIABY
Noticeable from the results is a lack of civic parochialism. While
opponents in Haystack expressed in the interviews that they did not want to be·ar
the risks for industriall development, they also did not want anyone else to bear
the risks. They think government and industry should find technol,ogical
alternatives instead of alternative sites (Statements # 8, 10, 45 and 47). In fact,
they rank alternative technologies high on the list of criteria most important to
them in making siting decisions (Table 4).
Until these new technologies can be employed, opponents favor
management of hazardous waste at the point of generation. As one respondent
put it, "companies should be forced to keep their waste at their plant and not
dump it on communities." This finding is more consistent wilth Heiman's (1990)
argument that local resistance to facility siting is not necessarily a parochial "Not
in my backyard!" response, but rather a "Not in anybody's backyard!" (NIABY)
response. He argues that citizens everywhere are now beginning to focus on
whether facilities are needed instead of where they should be located.
Conclusjons
The findings of this research suggest (but do not confirm due to a lack of
longitudinal data) that opposition in Haystack j,ntensified over time and that
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gridlock could have been prevented at several points in the siting decision
process.
The risk event that triggered the controversy was MMRS's proposal to site
a hazardous waste management facility in Haystack. This proposal caused
citizens to ask themselves and each other about the nature of the impacts that
may result and wondered whether they could be adversely affected. As they
discussed these impacts, they became more and more concerned. They began
to attend meetings at which their fears grew and their risk perception increased.
Later, concerned citizens began to ask why MMRS was proposing to
locate the facility in Haystack when the wastes were being generated in
Oklahoma City and other industrial areas of the state. The "why here?" question
triggered further concern and opposition among those who questioned the
fairness of locating the facility in their community.
The more the citizens learned about the facility and hazardous waste
management in general, they began to question the need for the facility
anywhere. Some citizens thought there were plenty of alternatives to waste
disposal that should be investigated first, such as recycling, source reduction,
and other similar waste minimization technologies.
After a series of meetings and a few months had passed, citizens began
to wonder whether OSDH cared about their concerns. It became apparent that
the proponents were determined to find a way to overcome local opposition and
site the facility. The government, it seemed, was indifferent to the opponents'
5·9
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concerns. When this became obvious, citizens began to feel that they had lost
their abiHty to influence the siting decision and that they no longer could control
their own destiny.
Despite repeated attempts by opponents to raise issues that they bel1ieved
would call into question the wisdom of siting the facility, the government pursued
its permitting process. The citizens believed the government should have
represented their interests and were disappointed that OSDH seemed to be
siding with MMRS. This damaged the reservoir of trust that existed prior to the
siting proposal.
Now that trust had eroded. it was clear that citizens needed to take
matters into their own hands. They finally found allies in the State Legislature
who empathized with their plight and championed a bill which placed a year-long
moratorium on siting until the OSDH siting rules could be reviewed and revised.
As reported in Chapter 3, the end result of these and subsequent efforts
permanently stalled the siting effort - gridlock!
Successful siting may have been accomplished had the proponents and
government not facilitated the intensification of the conflict to the point of
producing gridlock. Their failure to recognize the legitimacy of opponents'
concerns allowed the evolution of the controversy to gridlock.
Lessons to be learned: What should have been done?
There was not much more that MMRS could have done, short of
withdrawing their proposal, to reduce the risk beyond that posed by the facility.
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Equity could have been addressed by moving some of the jobs and other
benefits associated with the waste generating activities to the community. In
addition, compensation packages, such as tax relief or in kind payments, which
would have provided benefits to offset risks could have been offered.
Need could have been addressed by demonstrating that technologies are
not (yet) available to completely eliminate the need for disposal facilities.
Assurances would have been necessary, of course, to show that generators
were doing what they could do to reduce the quantity of waste generated.
A measure of control could have been g,iven to the community through
contracts and agreements between the community and MMRS which would have
allowed the community to oversee facility operations, suggest design
modifications, limit unit capacity and the period of operation, and to provide
financial assurances of safe closure and cleanup.
Had these remedies been implemented, it is likely that trust would not
have been eroded. The legitimization of citizens' interests would have
demonstrated that the company and OSDH shared their concerns and verified
that they were not being ignored or marginalized. The facility, as the following
citizen quote indicates, might then have been accepted;
'The site could have come in if MMRS had approached us
differently. "
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STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE
Relationships and Roles in the Haystack Situation
The following 8 questions concern the situation that existed in the Haystack
area.
1. What relationship did you have wi:th the Haystack area at the time of the
situation?
[ ] I lived in the Haystack area
[ ] A member of my family lived in the Haystack area
[ ] I own property in the Haystack area but did not live there
[ ] My children went to school in the Haystack area
[ ] I visited a park in the Haystack area
I ] Other (specify)
2. From what sources did you get information about the situation?
CHECK ALL THAT APPLY
[ ] News media
[ ] Friends and neighbors
[ ] MMRS
[ ] Environmental groups such as the National Toxics Campaign
[ ] Fellow workers at my place of employment
[ ] HEGI
[ ] US EPA
[ ] Oklahoma State Department of Health
[ ] Local government
[ ] Other (specify)
3. Which of the sources listed in Question #2 did you most rely on and trust?
LIST TOP 3 IN ORDER.
Most Important _
Second Most Important _
Third Most Important _
Why? (Explain these choices)
4. Which of the sources listed in Question #2 did you least rely on and trust?
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LIST BOTTOM 3 IN ORDER.
Least Important _
Next to Least Important _
Third Least Important _
Why? (Explain these choices)
5. How would you describe your participation in the situation at that time?
CHECKALL THAT APPLY
[ ] I did not participate
[ ] I signed a petition
[ ] I contacted a government official
[ ] I attended a meeting of concerned citizens
[ ] I spoke at a meeting of concerned citizens
[ ] I helped organize a meeting of concerned citizens
[ ] I attended a government meeting or public hearing
[ ] I testified at a government meeting or public hearing
[ ] I participated in a rally or demonstration
( ] I helped organize a rally or demonstration
[ ] Other (specify)
6. How often did you participate?
[ ] Never [ ] Seldom
[ ] Frequently
[ ] Occasional'ly
[ ] Continuously
7. At the time of the situation, what relationship, if any, did you have with the
group known as Haystack Environmental Group, Incorporated (HEGI)?
[ ] I didn't know anything about HEGI and had no dealings with them
[ ] I knew about HEGI but I had no dealings with them
[ ] I attended at least one HEGI meeting or other function sponsored by them
but I never became an active supporter or member
[ ] I was an active supporter or member of HEGI
[ ] Other (specify)
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8. What relationship did you or a family member have with MMRS before or
during that period?
[ ] I/family member had no employee or business relationship with MMRS
before or during the period of the situation
[ ] I/family was a MMRS employee during at least some of the period of the
situation
[ ] IIfamily was a MMRS employee before the situation began but not during it
[ ] IIfamily had a non-employee business relationship with MMRS during at
least some of the period of the situation
[ ] IIfamily had a non-employee business relationship with MMRS before the
situation began but not during it
[ ] Other (specify)
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OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW SCRIPT
1. How long have you lived in the Haystack area?
2. Let's talk about the MMRS siting situation. I am interested in your opinions
and recollections of events that occurred then. I understand that you played
an active role, is that correct?
3. About when did you get involved?
• For what reasons?
• Which of these is most important?
• Who was most responsible for influencing your involvement?
4. What were your concerns about the siting of a hazardous waste facility in
your community?
5. At the time of the siting situation there were some people who agreed with the
siting proposals and some who disagreed. What things about the siting do
you think most people agreed on?
6. I want to ask you now about how things have changed in the community
since the time you were active in the situation. How would you say things
have changed in your community economically since then?
7. How have things changed insofar as your sense of community; in other
words, how you view your community as a place to live and what it means to
you?
• Has the sense of community become stronger?,
8. Have there been any other proposals to site a hazardous waste facility in your
county? If so, did you feel more or less able to effectively respond to the
proposal?
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9. Let's talk about government's dealing:s with the siting.
What things did EPA, OSDH, and local government officials do right in
presenting the proposal to the community?
• What do you believe they might have done wrong?
10. What things did MMRS officials do right in presenting the proposal to the
community?
• What do you believe they might have done wrong?
• What do you believe MMRS could have done in order to best serve all
members of the community?
11. What things did citizens do right in dealing with the siting proposal?
• What do you believe might have been done wrong?
• Is there anything the citizens could have done to act in the best interest of
all community members?
12. Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about your feelings,
concerns, or suggestions about the Haystack situation or about hazardous
waste sitings in general that we haven't covered so far?
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DECISION CRITERIA CARDS
CARD 1: Fairness
Even though a decision may produce a community benefit when all costs and
benefits are added up, some citizens or neighborhoods may experience more
harm than good and other citizens or neighborhoods may experience more good
than harm. Some people may consider that an unequal distribution of costs,
benefits, and risks in a community is unfair.
I believe that the fairness of the distribution of benefits, costs, and risks
should be important in making community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 2: Understanding Local Culture
Communities vary in their traditions, customs, values, attitudes and identities.
Decisions that can affect a community may require that decision makers be
knowledgeable about the local culture. Since different communities and regions
of the nation have different cultures, it is not always easy to know what local
values may be.
I believe that an adequate consideration of the local community's culture
and values should be important in making community environmental siting
decisions
CARD 3: Technical and Legal Education
Decisions about siting hazardous waste facilities involve various technical and
legal issues. Technical issues may include the proper measurement of long term
health risks, whether a technology will operate as it was designed, and what the
odds are of a plant upset or spill that would result in a major environmental threat
to the community. Legal issues may include how to understand complicated
laws and regulation and what procedures apply in the decision making process.
Many of these issues are difficult to understand without technical and legal
education.
I believe that assurance of adequate training in relevant technical and legal
areas should be important in making community environmental siting
decisions.
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CARD 4: Trust in Government and Industry
Trust has different meanings. For example, acting in the community's best
interest (being a good neighbor), credibility (truthfulness, believability). and
openness (accessibility, forthrightness), may each be important to judgments
about whether a person or organization is trustworthy.
I believe that citizens' level of trust in government and industry should be
important in making community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 5: Community Disruption
Environmental siting activities may disrupt the normal flow of a community. For
example, rerouting of traffic, separation of one neighborhood from another, and
loss of reputation may cause a decline in a sense of community and an
interruption of long-held traditions.
I believe that consideration of the potential for community disruption
should be important in making community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 6: Alternative Technologies
It used to be commonplace to dispose of waste by dumping it into landfills and
open pits. Recently, there have been efforts to find alternatives to land disposal.
One approach is to develop new manufacturing techniques that do not generate
toxic waste, for example, by recycling wastes back into the process and by using
less dangerous raw materials. For those toxic wastes that cannot be eliminated,
new and innovative waste treatment methods are being developed that can
convert them into non-toxic forms without creating emissions or discharges to the
environment.
I believe that preference for alternative technologies such as recycling and
non-emitting waste treatment shoul'd be important in making community
environmental siting decisions.
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CARD 7: Citizen Involvement
Some citizens choose to become actively involved in decisions that affect their
community or them personally. The amount of involvement not only depends on
their willingness and ability to participate, but also on the opportunities that the
decision process offers for participation.
I believe that the provision of adequate opportunities for citizen
involvement should be important in making community environmental
siting decisions.
CARD 8: Economic Impact on the Community
Community environmental siting decisions can affect the economic health of the
community. Economic benefits could include creation of jobs; increase in tax
revenue; compensation in the form of cash payments; and improvements to
parks, libraries, schools, or hospitals. Economic costs could include loss of
tourism, change in land use, traffic disruption, and increases in demand for
community services.
I believe that economic impact on the community should be important in
making community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 9: Personal Judgments of Risk
People often make judgments about whether to accept or avoid risks. Factors
that may be important in judging environmental risk include personal familiarity
and understanding of the risk involved, whether the risks are voluntary and
controllable, whether experts agree on the amount of risk, whether children or
future generations are affected, and whether the risks are reversible or have
delayed effects.
I believe that citizens' judgments of risk should be important in making
community environmental siting decisions.
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CARD 10: Economic Impact on the Company
Private companies want to make a profit to stay in business. Ability to make a
profit can be affected by various costs, including costs of environmental
remediation, compliance with regulations, construction and operation, legal
liability, compensation payments to the community, and limits on how the
company may operate.
I believe that a company's abi.lity to make a profit should be important in
making community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 11: Access to Information
The ability to easily obtain relevant informabon in a timely manner and in an
understandable way can help people make informed decisions. This is
especially true if the decision involves complex issues where it is important to
consider all the facts.
I believe that assurances of citizens' timeily access to relevant information
should be important in making community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 12: Scientific Risk Estimates
Scientific experts in government and industry claim that they can scientifically
measure risk to human health and the environment. To estimate the risk that
may result from a harmful event, they multiply the seriousness of the potential
harm by how likely it is that the harm may happen.
I believe that scientific risk assessments should be important in making
community environmental siting decisions.
CARD 13: Personal Views Toward Technology
Some people claim that continuing advances in technology are important to
improving quality of Ufe. Others question whether reliance on technology is
always a good thing. For example, some people believe that some technologies
create more harm than good and should not be used.
I believe that citizens' views toward technology should be important in
making community environmental siting decisions.
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PARTICIPATION STRATEGY CARDS
CARD 1: Consultation
Government conducts public meetings, distributes information, conducts
surveys, and asks for comments throughout the siting process. Government
considers all public comments before making siting decisions.
I believe that community environmental siting decisions should be made
by government, but the public should be allowed to voice its concerns
throughout the entire decision making process.
CARD 2: Non-Binding Negotiation
Company officials are required to enter into preliminary negotiations with citizen
representatives of the community. Any agreement that may be reached will be
delivered to government decision makers for their consideration. However, the
siting decision will be made by the government. Its decision mayor may not
include any or all of the agreement.
I believe that citizens of a community and the company should be allowed
to try to reach an agreement before the government makes a community
environmental siting decision.
CARD 3: Third Party Mediation
A neutral third party attends all meetings between citizen representatives of the
community and the company concerning environmental siting decisions. The
mediator attempts to help the parties to reach an agreement. The agreement is
then forwarded to the government for their consideration; however, the
government is free to include none, part, or all of the agreement in its decisions.
I believe that a mediated agreement between the community and the
company should be reached before the government makes a community
siting decision; however, the government may pick and choose which, if
any, parts of the agreement to include in its decision.
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CARD 4: Binding Arbitration
A fixed period oftime (e.g., one year) is provided to allow community and
industry representatives to try to reach a voluntary agreement on siting the
facility. If no agreement is reached during this time, an experienced arbitrator
will consider the positions of both parties and develop a document that binds
both parties. Industry is require to pay for, but the citizens select, the arbitrator.
Subject to verification of the legality, the government is required to attach the
agreement to its permit and enforce it as part of its oversight duties
I believe that an independent arbitrator should be brought in to resolve
disputes between citizens and industry concerning siting decisions and
that government should be required to enforce the arbitrator's decisions.
CARD 5: Oversight Board
An oversight board composed of an equal number of citizens (selected by a
consensus of public interest groups in the community), industry representatives,
and government representatives provides continuous control of the entire
decision making process. All parties agree to abide by the oversight board's
decisions.
I believe that an oversight board, composed of equal numbers of
representatives from government, industry, and self-selected citizens,
should be used to oversee the entire decision making process concerning
siting decisions.
CARD 6: Referendum
Any siting decision must be approved by a vote of the majority of the community
before it can take effect.
I believe that siting decisions should be approved by a majority vote of the
citizens of a community before they can take effect.
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CARD 7: Citizen Control
The community itself controls the siting dedsion process. A citizens' committee,
whose representatives are chosen by members of various environmental,
community action, neighborhood development, and other citizens' groups, make
all decisions. The government and industry are bound by the decisions of the
committee and must provide whatever funds are necessary to comply with the
decisions of the committee.
I believe that siting decisions should be made solely by the citizens of a
community and that industry and government should be bound by those
decisions.
CARD 8: Preemption
The expertise of government officials is relied on to make siting decisions. The
public is effectively excluded from participating directly in the decision making
process.
I believe that siting decisions should be made by experts in government
and industry.
CARD 9: Public Comment and Hearing
The government makes a tentative siting decision, announces it to the public,
considers comments received from the public, and then makes a final deci'Sion.
I believe that siting decisions should be made by the g,overnment, but only
after the public has had a chance to comment on the proposals.
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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors
Factor Factor Difference
A B
38. If you have enough money, you can get away 1.2 -1.5 2.7
with polluting.
2. Offering cash payments to a community is the 0.3 -1.6 1.9
same as a bribe.
43. The siting process is unfair because the 0.6 -1.2 1.8
results provide greater risks to the people who
are ethnically different or poor.
18. Environmental laws are full of loopholes for 1.1 -0.7 1.8
industry advantage.
7. Citizens need to control which risks they have 0.8 -1.0 1.8
to put up with.
37. It is better to be active today than to be 1.2 -0.5 1.7
rad ioactive tomorrow
44. Environmental radicals are necessary to -0.2 -1.7 1.5
bring balance to the issues.
8. We should not take any chances with the 1.6 0.2 1.4
environment.
13. The people who benefit the most from a 1.5 0.2 1.3
waste facility are not the ones who bear the risk.
36. Citizens should initially oppose all proposals -0.5 -1.8 1.3
for siting by industry.
34. Economic special interests have too much 0.8 -0.4 1.2
influence in siting decisions.
11. The world would be a better place to live if -0.5 -1.4 0.9
we could go back to the good old days.
20. Allowing a waste facility to locate in a 0.5 -0.2 0.8
community divides a community.
47. 'Industry must be required to recycle, reduce 1.5 0.8 0.7
wastes, and use safer techniques and raw
materials.
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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors (continued)
Factor Factor Difference
A B
15. Cost effectiveness is more important to 0.3 -0.3 0.6
industry and government than environmental
issues.
35. The people living in a community know best 0.4 -0.1 0.5
what is good for them
30. Citizens should have their own experts. 0.8 0.4 0.5
33. Government uses citizen opinion against -0.4 -0.8 0.5
them.
22. Citizens should be involved in every step of a 1.1 0.7 0.4
siting decision.
19. The character of a community changes after 0.1 -0.3 0.4
a waste facility is located there.
32. Government shouldn't be trusted in making -0.0 -0.4 0.3
siting decisions.
21. Waste facilities give a community a bad 0.5 0.3 0.2
reputation.
42. Just being physically present in situations 0.2 -0.0 0.2
where environmental decisions are made is not
enough.
45. There are clean technologies available that 1.1 1.0 0.2
must be used now to reduce pollution.
24. Industry, government and the public should 0.6 0.5 0.1
decide together what level of pollution should be
allowed.
3. When jobs are scarce, an increase in -1.7 -1.7 0.1
employment is good even if there is resulting
pollution.
46. Government and industry skew their risk 0.6 0.6 0.0
estimates to suit their own purposes.
31. We would all be better off if the legal 0.6 0.7 -0.1
procedures were easier to follow.
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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors (continued)
Factor Factor Difference
A B
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a -1.5 -1.3 -0.1
company to make a profit, the restrictions should
be relaxed.
27. It is really hard to know if decision makers 0.4 0.7 -0.3
have the same values as I do.
12. It is better to put facilities in communities with -1.3 -0.9 -0.4
high unemployment; the people there need the
jobs.
25. All information should be shared in easily 0.7 1.2 -0.5
understood language as soon as it is available.
5. Industry works with communities to maintain a -0.7 0.2 -0.9
good public image.
26. Who provides information makes a difference 1.0 2.1 -1.0
to me; the person must be honest.
10. It doesn't matter how much we pollute today -2.3 -1.2 -1.1
because tomorrow's technology will solve the
problem.
39. Conflict in decision making is necessary and -0.0 1.1 -1.1
healthy.
9. I tolerate risk as a fact of life, but I don't like it. -0.2 0.9 -1.2
41. The chief function of government is to -1.3 -0.1 -1.2
support the economy.
14. Government and industry know what they are -1.7 -0.5 -1.2
doing; they are the experts.
28. It is impossible to know whether or not a 0.1 1.5 -1.4
process is really safe without adequate technical
education.
40. Consensus is impossible when activists -0.6 1.2 -1.8
become involved in environmental decisions.
16. The government adequately enforces -1.5 0.3 -1.9
environmental laws to protect human health and
safety.
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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors (continued)
Factor Factor Difference
A B
23. Citizens have ample opportunity to be -0.9 1.1 -1.9
involved in siting decisions in their community.
6. Scientific risk assessment should be the major -0.3 1.8 -2.1
consideration in siting decisions.
1. Waste facility siting means economic growth -1.7 0.4 -2.1
and prosperity for the community.
29. If the public were more familiar with the -0.9 1.2 -2.1
operation of a waste facility, they would be more
willing to consider it.
17. Industry usually complies with environmental -1.4 0.8 -2.3
laws even when it costs them money.
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Consensus Statements
z-score
47. Industry must be required to recycle. reduce wastes, 1.1
and use safer techniques and raw materials.
45. There are clean technologies available that must be 1.0
used now to reduce pollution.
25. All information should be shared in easily understood 1.0
language as soon as it is available.
22. Citizens should be involved in every step of a siting 0.9
decision.
31. We would all be better off if the legal procedures were 0.6
easier to follow.
46. Government and industry skew their risk estimates to 0.6
suit their own purposes.
30. Citizens should have their own experts. 0.6
27. It is really hard to know if decision makers have the 0.6
same values as I do.
24. Industry, government and the public should decide 0.5
together what level of pollution should be allowed.
21. Waste facilities give a community a bad reputation. 0.4
35. The people living in a community know best what is 0.2
good for them
20. Allowing a waste facility to locate in a community divides 0.2
a community.
42. Just being physically present in situations where 0.1
environmental decisions are made is not enough.
15. Cost effectiveness in more important to industry and -0.0
government than environmental issues.
19. The character of a community changes after a waste -0.1
facility is located there.
32. Government shouldn't be trusted in making siting -0.2
decisions.
5. Industry works with communities to maintain a good -0.2
public image
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Consensus Statements, Continued
33. Government uses citizen opinion against them.
11. The world would be a better place to live if we could go
back to the good old days.
12. It is better to put facilities in communities with high
unemployment; the people there need the jobs.
4. If environmental restrictions limit the ability of a company
to make a profit, the restrictions should be relaxed.
3. When jobs are scarce, an increase in employment is
good even if there is resulting pollution.
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z-score
-0.6
-1.0
-1.1
-1.4
-1.7
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